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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

NOS. 45725 & 45726

Plaintiff-Respondent,

ADA COUNTY NOS. CR0l-16-27437
& CR0l-17-00796

vs.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ANTHONY JAMES IRA BARCLAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony James Ira Barclay pleaded guilty to failure to notify of a death, destruction of
evidence and burglary based upon his actions assisting Francis March after she murdered Mark
Irwin. The district court sentenced Mr. Barclay to 25 years in prison, 18 fixed, with all three
sentences running consecutively. Mr. Barclay appealed, asserting that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to consider his young age, minimal criminal record, serious mental health and
substance abuse issues, family support and remorse for the crime.
The State responded by arguing Mr. Barclay's sentence was appropriate given "the nature
of the offenses, his criminal behavior and the danger he poses to the community." (Resp. Br., p.6.)
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This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that the district court
considered all of the information at its disposal. Mr. Barclay relies upon the arguments presented
in his Appellant's Brief and will not repeat those arguments here.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously articulated in Mr.
Barclay's Appellant's Brief, and are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1. Was the district court's aggregate sentence of 18 years, fixed, unreasonable under any view
of the facts?
2. Did the district court sufficiently consider Mr. Barclay's young age, minimal criminal
record, serious mental health and substance abuse issues, family support and remorse for
the crime?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court's Aggregate Sentence of 18 Years. Fixed, Was Unreasonable Under Any
View Of The Facts
The Idaho Court of Appeals has long recognized sentence review as one of its
responsibilities. State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 67-79 (1978). The general objectives of appellate
sentence review are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert
grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for the law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by
increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2

(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both
rational and just.

State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48, 54 (Ct.App. 2011) (quoting, State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,
384 (1978). This power to review recognizes an obligation to defer to the trial court, but does not
preclude refashioning sentences to meet these objectives. Id. In practice, appellate courts in Idaho
have disfavored lengthy consecutive sentences for young offenders in positions similar to Mr.
Barclay.
In State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court remanded
district court commitment orders that sentenced two men, aged 20 and 21, to two, consecutive 14year terms for grand larcenies incurred over a brief period of time. Though the sentences fell within
the maximums set by statute, the Court held that the consecutive sentences were excessive and
unduly harsh because a term of imprisonment that exceeding the length of the defendant's natural
lives thus far failed to serve the objective of rehabilitation. Id. The Court ordered that the sentences
be run concurrently on the reasoning that doing so would allow both men the full benefit of
rehabilitative services available during their incarceration. Id.
In State v. Justice, this Court modified a twenty-one-year-old man's consecutive 14-year
sentences for grand theft and forgery to run concurrently after determining that the fixed portion
of the sentence was "longer than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing." 152 Idaho at
55. The defendant was convicted of grand theft for stealing an acquaintances truck and forgery for
cashing checks stolen from a friend. Id. At 50. He had previously been convicted for felony crimes
of burglary, escape, grand theft, and assault and battery upon certain personnel and had committed
"numerous violations, including the crimes charged in the instant case" while on parole. Id. at 53.
The defendant showed no remorse, claimed he would be unsuccessful on community supervision
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and asked to serve out the remainder of his sentence. Id. The sentencing court determined that the
defendant was an unacceptable risk to society and crafted a sentence that focused on punishment
rather than rehabilitation. This Court agreed with the sentencing judge but still chose to modify
the sentencing finding that an aggregate sentence of 28 years fixed was longer than reasonably
necessary for retribution and rehabilitation.
The prevailing theme of these and other cases, is that appellate intervention is proper where
excessive sentences fail to serve the goals of sentencing. See, also, Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482
(Ct.App 2008)(This Court reduced an aggregate sentence of 78 years, 29 fixed, to an aggregate
term of 14 years, 5 fixed, where ad defendant committed a series of thefts that occurred between
September 1996 and May 1999 and defrauded nine families of nearly one and a half million dollars
after finding the duration of incarceration was greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of
sentencing); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982)(the Idaho Supreme Court reduced the fixed
sentence of a man convicted oflewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen
years in violation of I.C. § 18-6607 from ten years to six after finding that the trial court did not
give proper consideration to the defendant's alcohol problem and lack of criminal history).
Mr. Barclay argues that the sentence imposed in this case is similarly excessive and should
be modified by the Court. Like the defendants in Dunnagan, he is a young man facing a fixed term
of confinement longer than his natural life so far. If Mr. Barclay is a risk to society as the defendant
was in Justice, he has at least demonstrated remorse and a desire to start again. Though he would
not contest that his role in the aftermath of Mark Irwin's death shocks the conscience, he argues
that the mitigating circumstances available to sentencing court show that he can and should be
given an opportunity for rehabilitation.
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II.
The District Court Did Not Sufficiently Consider Mr. Barclav's Young Age, Minimal Criminal
Record, Serious Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues, Family Support, and Remorse as
Mitigating Factors?

Mr. Barclay questions whether the record supports the State's assertion that the district
court "thoroughly considered all of the information before it." "A trial court is not required to
recite the sentencing criteria to the defendant before pronouncing sentence. However, the absence
of any expressed determinative reasons deemed important casts a shadow on the propriety of the
terms of the sentence." State v. Castro, 131 Idaho 274,275 (Ct. App 1998)(citing State v. Casper,
127 Idaho 796 (Ct. App. 1993)(intemal citations omitted).
The district court clearly reasoned that a lengthy prison term followed by a period of
supervised release served the objectives of punishment and protection of society (12/14/17 Tr.,
p. 75 1.24 - p. 77 L.1 ). While the court asserted that rehabilitation plays "some role" in its sentence
(12/14/17 Tr., p.69 L.25 - p.70 L.2) it was silent as to what that role is. In support of his argument
that his sentence is objectively unreasonable Mr. Barclay argues that the sentencing court, in
justifying retribution, either ignored or gave short-shrift mitigating factors established in statute
and case law.
a. Mr. Barclay's Age
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barclay argues that the district court did not consider his
young age as a mitigating circumstance. The State asserts that the district court specifically
considered Mr. Barclay's young age, citing the court's observations that
The defendant, as I've noted, is 20 years old. The three charges considered together,
with consecutive sentences being imposed on each of them, would allow me to ordered
[sic] the defendant's imprisonment for a period of 25 years. That makes him more or less
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45 years old if I were to give him the absolute maximum, as the state has asked me to do
today.
(12/14/17 Tr., p.70, Ls.2-9) and, while listing mitigating what it considered to be significant
mitigating factors,
He is very young, very young at the time of the alleged crimes. Social science seems
to suggest at this point that a 19-year-old man is not a fully formed person with a fully
formed brain at this point. We don't know, I suppose, on some level what kind of, with
additional development of his brain, where Mr. Barclay will wind up. So that maybe taken
in some mitigation that this is a person who is still becoming fully formed, and ultimately
when later in life may be better equipped to make less terrible decisions than he has made
so far in his life.
(12/14/17 Tr., p. 71, L.22 -p.72, L.9).
Mr. Barclay argues that the district court's comments reflect mere acknowledgment rather
than consideration of his age as a mitigating factor. See e.g. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho at 126; Justice,
152 Idaho at 53. If the sentencing court truly considered Mr. Barclay to be not completely formed,
it should have considered the consequences of finishing the process in a correctional facility and
how, if at all, Mr. Barclay will be better equipped at 45 to make better decisions than at 35.
b. Mr. Barclay's criminal record
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Barclay argues that the district court did not consider previous
criminal record as a mitigating circumstance. The State disagrees, pointing to a single line in the
transcript where the court acknowledges that Mr. Barclay "did have a significant juvenile criminal
history leading up to this, including a history of burglaries, had some adult criminal history that
predates these offenses as well." (12/14/17 Tr., p.71, L.23-p.72, L.l). Mr. Barclay argues that
again, simple recognition of a factor is not consideration of a factor. From the trial record it is
impossible to conclude whether the court considered Mr. Barclay's previous criminal record as a
mitigating or compounding factor, let alone how it contributed to the court's sentence.
c. Mr. Barclay's substance abuse issues
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As the State notes, the sentencing court did consider Mr. Barclay's substance abuse history.
(12/14/17 Tr., p.721. 1-15). However, rather than discussing the role that Mr. Barclay's addiction
may have played in his crimes and alternatives for treating the problem as required under State v.

Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982), the court simply concludes that his substance abuse problem
"contributes to the risk he presents to the community."
d. Mr. Barclay's mental health issues, family support, and remorse for the crime.
The State does not specifically rebut Mr. Barclay's contentions that the sentencing court
failed to consider his mental health issues, family support, and remorse for the crime. Instead it
cites generally to the court's sentencing comments for the proposition that ''the district court
thoroughly considered all the information before it." (Resp. Br., p.6).
While Mr. Barclay would refer the Court to pages 3-8 of his Appellant's Brief for his full
argument on these points, he asserts that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating
information that, taken together, paints the picture of a young man who was significantly addicted
and significantly depressed; a young man who would be a ripe target for a woman who could
provide him with drugs and sex in exchange for loyalty, and a young man with a caring and
dedicated family who could help him through the process of rehabilitation while he is incarcerated
and beyond. It is unclear from the record whether the sentencing court adequately, if ever,
considered this mitigating information in fashioning Mr. Barclay's sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Barclay respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate
and/or in the alternative requests this Court vacate his judgments of conviction and remand these
cases for a new sentencing hearing.
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DATED this 5th day of October, 2018

J.E. SUTTON & ASSOCIATES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of October, 2018, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described below

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Delivered via e-mail to:
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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